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Tenth & Eleventh Lectures 
Capital and State: Imperialism and Beyond 
 
 
Regimes of differential accumulation 
 The pendulum of breadth and depth: M&A vs stagflation 
 “Economic” anomaly or the engine of capital accumulation? 
 Regimes of differential accumulation: the spread and deepening of capital as power 
 
The current crossroads 
 Neoliberalism as a breadth regime: 1980s-2000s 
 Regime shift: reaching the envelope 
 The new global context: jurisdictional integration, China, excess capacity 
 The threat: debt deflation 
 The solution: default or inflation 
 How to trigger inflation: the oil factor 
 
Imperialism 
 The happy 1990s: from Global Village to The End of History to No Logo 
 The 2000s: the Empire strikes back 
 Why imperialism: the state-centric approach 
 Anarchy: the invisible hand of economics vs. the hidden fist of global politics 
 From superpower confrontation to the omnipotent empire 
 The resource imperative: make it plenty and cheap 
 The invasion of Iraq: “It’s All About Oil” 
 
Imperialism? 
 Accumulation = growth + price stability? 
 U.S. policy and OPEC: friends or foes? 
 Why strike at a dysfunctional cartel? 
 The Bush presidency: an “oil administration”? 
 Conspiracy theory: the neo-cons contra the oil firms 
 OPEC and the oil companies: divergence or convergence? 
 What determines the price of oil: production, “scarcity” or power? 
 
Oil and profits 
 The accumulation triangle: differential prices, differential profits and energy conflicts 
 Danger zones 
 Energy conflicts and differential accumulation: the stylized facts 
 Capital accumulation: “one factor” or the overarching architecture of power? 
 
New imperialism or new capitalism? 
 The pro-inflation coalition 
 The oil companies and OPEC: the quest for high price 
 The armament companies and the neo-cons: the Project for the New American Century and the 
new Pearl Harbour 
 Dominant capital: the need for depth 
 The victims of deflation: capital at large and the “policy makers” 
 Conspiracy theory or the state of capital? 
 Determinism or open ended history? 
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FIGURE 1 Amalgamation and Stagflation in the U.S.A. 
 
* Computed as the average of: (1) the standardised deviations from the average rate of unemployment; and (2) 
the standardized deviation from the average rate of inflation of the GDP implicit price deflator.  
 
** Mergers and acquisitions expressed as a per cent of gross fixed private domestic investment. 
 
NOTE: Series are shown as 5-year moving averages (the first four observations in each series cover data to that 
point only). 
 
SOURCE: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2009), Figure 17.1 p. 384. The stagflation index is computed based on data from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: RUC for the rate of unemployment since 1929; 
PDIGDP for the GDP implicit price deflator); Historical Statistics of the United States (series D-8, p. 126 for the rate 
of unemployment before 1929). For details on the Amalgamation Index, see the Appendix to Chapter 15 in 
Nitzan and Bichler, Capital as Power. A Study of Order and Creorder.  
 
 
 
Regimes of Differential Accumulation 
 
Period Breadth through M&A Subsequent Conflict 
1900s Monopoly WWI stagflation 
1920s Oligopoly WWII stagflation 
1960s Conglomerate Vietnam / Middle East stagflation 
1990s Global New Wars stagflation 
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FIGURE 2 The Threat of Deflation 
 
* January-April. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal 
of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 8, p. 292. Original data are from Business Source 
Premier. 
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FIGURE 3 The Debt Load 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal 
of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 9, p. 295. Debt data until 1951 are from the Bank 
Credit Analyst Research Group; data from 1952 onward are from the Federal Reserve Board through Global 
Insight (series code: FL894104005). GDP data until 1928 are from Global Financial Data; data from 1929 
onward are from the U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight afterward (series code: GDP). 
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Don’t Worry About Deflation: Soothing Statements, 2002 
 
‘Ignore the Ghost of Deflation. Apart from Japan, the world has not seen deflation for 70 years.’ 
 
Financial Times columnist Samuel Britton  
 
‘Deflation is an overblown worry.’ 
 
James Grant, editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer.  
 
‘Believe in Ghosts, Goblins, Wizards and Witches if you will, but don’t believe in deflation occurring 
any time soon.’  
 
Financial expert Adrian Douglas 
  
‘The United States is nowhere close to sliding into a pernicious deflation.’  
 
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan 
 
‘The good news is that monetary policy never runs out of power.’  
 
Former member of the Federal Reserve Board, Angell Wayne, 
 
‘There’s a much exaggerated concern about deflation. It’s not a serious prospect. Inflation is still a 
much more serious problem than deflation. Today’s Federal Reserve is not going to repeat the 
mistakes of the Federal Reserve of the 1930s. The cure for deflation is very simple. Print Money.’  
 
Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman 
 
‘Deflation is always reversible under a fiat money system. The U.S. government has a technology 
called the printing press that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no 
cost.’ 
 
Ben Bernanke, ‘Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here,’ 
 
*** 
 
Quoted from Robert Prechter, “Deflation: Once More Into the Breach,” The Elliott Wave 
Theorist, January, 2003 and from the Federal Reserve Board website.
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FIGURE 4 Inflation and the Price of Oil 
 
* Computed as the $ price of crude oil deflated by the U.S. CPI. 
 
NOTE: Series are smoothed as 3-month moving averages. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal 
of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 10, p. 300. Original data are from International 
Financial Statistics through Global Insight (series codes: L64@C110 for the CPI of the industrialized countries; 
L76AA&Z@C001 for the price of crude oil; L64@C111 for the U.S. CPI). 
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Imperialism 
 
‘Imperialism used to be the white man’s burden. This gave it a bad reputation. But imperialism 
doesn’t stop being necessary because it is politically incorrect.’ 
 
Michael Ignatieff, Professor of Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University 
 
 
‘Our goals is not combating a rival, but maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining imperial 
order.’ 
 
Professor Stephen Peter Rosen, Head of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University 
 
 
‘The main task of the United States in preserving its empire is ‘to prevent collusion and maintain 
dependence among the vassals, [to] keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians 
from coming together.’ 
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter 
 
 
‘For globalization to work, America can’t be afraid to act like the almighty superpower it is. . . . The 
hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist . . . and the hidden fist that keeps 
the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine 
Corps.’  
 
Thomas Friedman, New York Times 
 
 
‘Globalisation, the economic imperialism of capital taken to its logical conclusion, has, paradoxically, 
required a new doctrine of extraeconomic, and especially military, coercion. . . . It has, in fact, been a 
major strategy of capitalist imperialism even to create local states to act as conduits of capitalist 
imperatives. . . .  “Operation Infinite War” is apparently intended to produce something more like 
Hobbes’s ‘state of war’. . . . It is this endless possibility of war that imperial capital needs in order to 
sustain its hegemony over the global system of multiple states. . . . This does not necessarily mean that 
the US, as global capital’s ultimate coercive power, will wage war for no reason at all, just for the 
purpose of display.’ 
 
Ellen Meiksins Wood 
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The Invasion of Iraq 
 
‘America’s chief interest in going after Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, is doubtless to save the 
world from his actual or potential weapons of mass destruction. Another large consideration, 
secondary as it may be, has attracted less attention than it should have: the effects that would follow 
from the opening up of the country's enormous reserves of oil. . . . It might seem, then, that knocking 
out Mr Hussein would kill two birds with one stone: a dangerous dictator would be gone, and with 
him would go the cartel that for years has manipulated prices, engineered embargoes and otherwise 
harmed consumers.’ 
  
The Economist, Septmeber 14, 2002 
 
 
‘The first reason here is oil – the desire for greater U.S. control of Iraqi (and thus indirectly other 
Middle Eastern) oil resources. The second reason is the U.S. desire to extend the U.S. drive for global 
domination. The third and last reason on this list is the desire of many dominant leaders of the Bush 
administration in the U.S., in partnership with the Sharon government in Israel, that a conquest of 
Iraq become the first stage of a ‘strategic transformation’ of the entire Middle East.’  
 
Bill Christison, formerly a top political analyst at the CIA, CounterPunch, February 8, 2003 
   
 
‘Oil appears in Washington's calculations about Iraq as a strategic rather than an economic resource: 
the war against Saddam is about guaranteeing American hegemony rather than about increasing the 
profits of Exxon. . . . As part of their grand plan for using a “liberated” Iraq as a base from which to 
promote democracy and capitalism across the Middle East, they want Baghdad to explore for new 
reserves, rapidly increase production capacity and quickly flood the world market with Iraqi oil. They 
know that this would lead to an oil price crash, driving it to $15 a barrel or less. They hope that this 
collapse will stimulate economic growth in the US and the West, finally destroy Opec . . . wreck the 
economies of “rogue states” (Iran, Syria, Libya), and create more opportunities for “regime change” 
and democratisation.’ 
 
Yahya Sadowski. No War for Whose Oil? Collateral Damage From An Illegal War. Le 
Monde Diplomatique, April 17, 2003. 
 
 
‘There were only two credible reasons for invading Iraq: control over oil and preservation of the dollar 
as the world's reserve currency. . . . By invading Iraq, Bush has taken over the Iraqi oil fields, and 
persuaded the UN to lift production limits imposed after the Kuwait war. Production may rise to 3m 
barrels a day by year end, about double 2002 levels. More oil should bring down Opec-led prices, and 
if Iraqi oil production rose to 6m barrels a day, Bush could even attack the Opec oil-pricing cartel.’ 
 
John Chapman. The Real Reason Bush Went to War. The Guardian, July 28, 2004 
. 
 
‘From all that can be seen, oil production in Iraq is likely to remain depressed for years, no matter 
how much more blood is shed in its pursuit. It is already evident that American military action will 
not lead to democracy in Iraq, merely to the division of the country into separate ethnic enclaves, one 
possibly ruled by Iranian-like ayatollahs; it can now also be said that we will not gain any additional 
petroleum supplies as a result of all this sacrifice and tragedy. Not only has the use of force to procure 
Iraqi oil failed to achieve its intended results, it has actually made the situation worse.’ 
 
Michael Klare. The Failed Mission to Capture Iraqi Oil. Information Clearing House, 
September 22. 2005. 
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The Conventional Wisdom 
 
‘. . . If there is any agreement among the pundits, this surely must be it: the coming war on Iraq will be 
fought largely over oil. The gist of the argument is simple enough, and can be summarized as follows:  
 In order to continue growing, the world economy needs plenty of cheap oil; 
 The OPEC cartel stands in the way of that goal. For years, its members have manipulated output 
to keep prices high; 
 Now, there is finally an opportunity to change the rules of the game, perhaps even to make the oil 
cartel irrelevant; 
 The entry point is Iraq. The country, says George Bush Jr., has become a “global threat.” It 
supports terrorism, it has weapons of mass destruction, and it has a ruler unscrupulous enough to 
use them. In the age of ‘preventive strikes,’ these are sufficient reasons to invade thy neighbour; 
 Once victorious, the invading armies will install a new, more friendly leader. This ruler will adopt 
a new energy policy, hostile to OPEC and friendly to the United States and the West. And since 
Iraq has 11 per cent of the world’s crude oil reserves and the ability to pump out plenty of it, the 
days of high oil prices will soon be over. . . .’ 
From Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, 2003. It's All About Oil. News From Within 
Vol. XIX, No 1, January 2003, pp. 8-11. 
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FIGURE 5 OPEC and the Oil Companies 
 
* British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (till 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 
1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to merger. 
 
SOURCE: Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal of World 
Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 12, p. 307. Original data are from OPEC Annual Statistical 
Bulletin; Fortune. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Nitzan / 4292 PE of Capital Accumulation  10 & 11. Capital and State: Imperialism and Beyond / 11 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Global Net Profit:
Integrated Oil 
Companies
as a Share of 
All Companies 
(left)
$ Price of Oil / 
U.S. CPI
(one year earlier, right)
$2007 / bblper cent
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6 The Price of Oil and the Global Distribution of Profit 
 
NOTE: Net profit is computed by dividing market value by the price/earning ratio. Data are restated to reflect 
changes in the series constituent companies. Series are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. The last data 
points are for September 2009. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal 
of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 11, p. 304. Original data are from Datastream 
(series codes: OILNWD for the integrated oil companies; TOTMKWD for world total); International Financial 
Statistics through Global Insight (series codes L76AA&Z@C001 for the price of crude oil; L64@C111 for the 
U.S. CPI). 
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FIGURE 7 Oil: World Production and Price 
 
NOTE: Series are smoothed as 12-month moving averages. Last data points are May 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/query/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01B); IMF International 
Financial Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes L76AA&Z@C001 for the 
price of crude oil; L64@C111 for the U.S. CPI). 
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FIGURE 8 “Scarcity” and the Real Price of Oil 
 
NOTE: The real price is the spot $ price divided by the U.S. Implicit GDP Deflator. Excess consumption / 
production is equal to world consumption less production as a per cent of their average. According to British 
Petroleum, this excess is accounted for by “stock changes, consumption of non-petroleum additives and 
substitute fuels, and disparities in the definition, measurement or conversion of oil supply and oil demand data.” 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In: The 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition – Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle-East ‘Energy Conflicts’, 
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3, Figure 6, p. 489. Original data are from British Petroleum 
(Annual); IMF and U.S. Department of Commerce through Global Insight. 
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FIGURE 9 Return on Equity: The Petro-Core* versus the Fortune 500 
 
* British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (till 2000), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 
1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to merger. 
 
NOTE: Until 1993, the Fortune 500 list included only industrial corporations (firms deriving at least half their 
sales revenues from manufacturing or mining). From 1994 onward, the list includes all corporations. For 1992-3, 
data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special charges.  
 
SOURCE: Updated from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In: The 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition – Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle-East ‘Energy Conflicts’, 
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3, Figure 10a, p. 499. Original data are from Fortune; Standard 
& Poor’s Compustat.  
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                     'Energy Conflict'
        'Danger Zone'
The New Wars: The Stylized Facts 
 
 First, every energy conflict in the Middle East was preceded by a danger zone, in which the oil 
companies suffered differential decumulation. 
 
 Second, every energy conflict was followed by a period during which the oil companies beat the 
average. 
 
 And, third, with only one exception in 1996-7, the oil companies never managed to beat the 
average without an Energy Conflict first taking place. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10 The Petro-Core’s Differential Accumulation and Middle East ‘Energy Conficts’ 
 
* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential return on equity is the difference 
between the return on equity of the Petro-Core and the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on 
equity of the Fortune 500. For 1992-3, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 special 
charges  
 
NOTE. The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), Chevron (till 2000), Exxon 
(ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 1998) and Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are 
due to merger. The Energy Conflicts include: the 1967 Arab-Israel war, the 1973 Arab-Israel war, the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, the 1979 first Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980 
Iran-Iraq war, the 1982 second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1990-1 first Gulf War, the 2000 second 
Palestinian Intifada, the 2001-2 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the launching of the ‘War on Terror’ and the 
2002-3 second Gulf War. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Bringing Capital Accumulation Back In: The 
Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition – Military Contractors, Oil Companies and Middle-East ‘Energy Conflicts’, 
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 3, Figure 10b, p. 499. Original data are from Fortune; 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat. 
Year Energy Conflict 
1967 Israeli-Arab 
1973 Israeli-Arab 
1979 Lebanon / Hostages / Afghanistan 
1980 Iraq-Iran 
1982 2nd Invasion Lebanon 
1990-1 1st Gulf War 
2000 Intifada 
2001 Afghanistan 
2002-3 2nd Gulf War 
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FIGURE 11 U.S. Military Spending as a Share of GDP 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, Dominant Capital and the New Wars, Journal 
of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2 (August), Figure 16, p. 319. Till 1928, data for military spending 
are from Nils Petter Gleditsch, The Peace Dividend (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 1996), and data for GDP 
are from Global Financial Data. From 1929 onward, data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce through 
Global Insight (series codes: GDP for GDP; GFML for military spending). 
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FIGURE 12 Shares of Global Market Capitalization 
 
NOTE: Series denote monthly data shown as 12-month moving averages. The last data points are for May 2011. 
 
SOURCE: Updated from Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel  (London: 
Pluto Press), Figure 5.9 p. 272. Original data are from Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD for world total, 
OILINWD for integrated oil; AERSPWD for defence; TECNOWD for technology). 
 
 
 
Periodicity 
 
 
 
Period Differential Accumulation Regime Coalition 
1970s – Mid 1980s Depth / frequent energy conflicts Weapon$-Petro$ 
Mid 1980s – 1990s Breadth / infrequent energy conflict Techno$-Merger$ 
2000s Depth / frequent energy conflicts Weapon$-Petro$ 
2010s ?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
